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FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4808
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2349
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 5654
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 5667
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8657
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2966
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 6335
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0737
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0164
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8693
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 1806
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3406
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 4446
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 4386
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RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 2695
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 3625
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1040
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003882

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PK IN IR AF
SUBJECT: NAM DECLARATION ON IRAN: MEA SAYS GOI POSITION ON
IRAN HAS NOT CHANGED

REF: A. STATE 89325
 1B. NEW DELHI 3856

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Classified By: DCM Robert Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

11. (C) Summary: DCM delivered Ref A demarche on June 5, stressing USG concern that India agreed to such a one-sided and weak NAM statement regarding Iranian nuclear activity, and noting that sending mixed messages to Iran at this critical juncture is not productive. Minister of State for External Affairs Anand Sharma responded that the GOI position has not changed since the February 4 resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors, and stressed that Iran must meet its obligations under the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and comply fully with the IAEA. Sharma asserted that in private he reiterated to the Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki that Iran must abide by IAEA commitments. Deputy Permanent Representative (DPR) to the UN Ajai Malhotra remarked that the GOI supported an earlier statement that was much more critical of Iran, but under pressure to forge a document all members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) could support, the final version was severely "watered down." Sharma commented that FM Mottaki told him Iran "sees room from diplomacy to take place" and that the Tehran's "hopes were raised after engagement with the EU." Sharma also used the meeting to highlight language Pakistan and Cuba hoped to include in the final document, which he indicated would have been against USG interests. The NAM declaration received

zero press play here, proving the organization's near total irrelevance. End Summary.

Mixed Messages Will Not Help

¶ 12. (C) DCM delivered Ref A demarche, indicating USG disappointment over the statement on Iran's nuclear program released by the NAM ministers in Kuala Lumpur. The statement is one-sided, does not mention Iran's failure to meet IAEA commitments and is out of sync with stated GOI policies, DCM Blake stated. Attaching GOI approval to public statements, which will likely be viewed by many as GOI waffling on a very important issue, at such a critical juncture is not productive, he noted.

No Change to GOI Position

¶ 13. (C) MEA Minister of State Anand Sharma asserted that the GOI position towards Iran had not changed and that India delivered a clear message in private meetings with Iranian FM Mottaki. The final NAM declaration was a "watered down" version of the statement the GOI hoped the ministers would approve, he claimed. DPR Malhotra asserted that the initial statement the GOI had co-authored was much firmer towards Iran, but that the Organization of Islamic Conferences (OIC) countries opposed the language. Noting that the document required approval by all NAM countries, Malhotra remarked that the participants had to form a consensus. He indicated that Malaysia, as chair of the meeting, was intent on appeasing other Muslim members of the NAM and helped press the watered-down version. Malhotra also acknowledged that, as always, the GOI first and foremost would protect its

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national interests, and was therefore wary of including language regarding the NPT, to which India is not a signatory. Malhotra commented that a number of other countries, notably Singapore, were also pressing for harsher language towards Iran.

Iran to India: Room For Diplomacy

¶ 14. (C) Sharma claimed that Iranian FM Mottaki told him there was "room for diplomacy to take place" and that, "from Tehran's perspective, their hopes were raised after recent engagement with the EU." Sharma commented that Mottaki reasserted Iran's right to have civil nuclear power. Sharma stated that he informed Mottaki that Iran also has commitments to the IAEA and must abide by them.

¶ 15. (C) Noting that the recent USG decision to engage in direct dialogue with Iran was a significant change in policy and a window of opportunity, DCM Blake suggested that the time was right for India to use its unique influence to press Tehran towards a diplomatic solution. Sharma responded that he was "very forthright" in expressing the GOI's view that Iran must abide by its commitments under the NPT and IAEA. But he did not know if India had communicated with Iran since the Ambassador's meeting with NSA Narayanan on June 2 (Ref B).

Pakistan Always the Bad Guy

¶ 16. (C) Taking the opportunity to highlight Pakistan as a trouble-maker, Sharma showed DCM Blake two paragraphs expressing concern over Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan that Pakistan blocked from being inserted into the NAM Outcome Document. He noted that all other NAM countries approved of the language. He also noted that Pakistan and Cuba attempted to insert language expressing concern over "gross violation of human rights... resulting from terrorist acts including those perpetrated by foreign occupying powers in territories under foreign occupation," claiming that such

language would be used by Cuba to "bash the US" over actions in Iraq. (Note: It is likely that Pakistan was attempting to include the language to highlight supposed abuses by the Indian Military in Jammu and Kashmir. End Note.)

Comment: Virtually No Media Coverage of the NAM Statement

17. (C) While GOI acquiescence to of the weak and misleading NAM statement was not helpful, the statement has received virtually no publicity here, reflecting the NAM's growing irrelevance. It is in the GOI's national interest to ensure Iran does not become a nuclear weapon state, and India will continue to conduct its foreign policy with this in mind. The GOI is also conscious of the close attention members of the U.S. Congress and the Administration are paying to GOI actions on Iran and the potential for such actions to adversely affect congressional consideration of the U.S.-India civil nuclear initiative.

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